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We study the development of wage elasticity of labor supply for Austrian men and women 
over time using comparable and representative survey data for the 1980s and 1990s. The 
elasticity of men is relatively low and constant over time, similar to the behavior of single 
women. Most remarkable is the almost continuous reduction in the labor supply reactions of 
married women: while their elasticity was still several times larger at the beginning of the 
1980s, they approached rapidly the much less elastic behaviour of men. These developments 
are important for the analysis of deadweight losses of taxation as well as the effects of tax 
reforms and wage subsidy programs.   
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1. Introduction 
 
Similar to most industrialized countries, female labour supply in Austria has been increasing 
for the last decades. During the last 35 years labor force participation rate of women (aged 
between 15-64) has been rising from 49% in 1971 to 67% in the year 2006 (Source: Census 
1971, Micro-Census 2006, Statistics Austria). While labor force participation for men has 
been  constant  or  even  somewhat  declining,  participation  rates  of  women  are  rapidly 
approaching those of men. Policy circles – such as the European Union’s Lisbon Agenda – 
often  advocate  increases  in  female  labour  force  participation  as  remedies  for  an  ageing 
population, shrinking workforce and increasing retirement burden. 
 
  A rising female participation in the employment system can be seen as a general social 
trend; arising from changing roles of women in society over time, reduced family size or the 
general quest for emancipation and self-reliance of younger generations of women (Fortin, 
2005,  Brooks  and  Bolzendahl,  2004).  Economists  typically  are  interested  in  economic 
rationales  for  work  participation,  in  particular  the  impact  of  wages  on  labour  supply. 
Knowledge  about  labour  supply  elasticities  is  necessary  to  understand  the  reaction  of 
economic actors to changes in market wages, taxation and parameters of the social security 
system. General wisdom among labour economists is that the wage elasticity of men is close 
to zero, whereas (own) wage elasticities of married women are much higher – around –0.8 
(Blundell  and  MaCurdy,  1999).  These  differences  are  often  explained  by  the  traditional 
division of labor in the family: women divide their time between market work, leisure and 
household  work,  whereas  typical  men  disregard  the  latter.  Because  women  have  closer 
substitutes for their time spent in market work as men have, changes in market wages can be 
assumed to have larger substitution effects on women’s labor supply (Blau and Kahn, 2007). 
  
  Goldin (1990) argues that an inverse U-shaped development over time for women’s  
wage elasticities should be observed. At the beginning of the last century when female market 
work was not so common and was against the social norm in society, women’s wage elasticity 
related to their own wage should be very low, but their reaction to their husband’s wages 
should be high: women would take up paid market work only if their husband was not able to 
support them. As time progressed married women with increasingly higher education entered 
the labor market more frequently making regular market work for women very common and 
leading to an increase in the wage elasticity. Goldin (1990) provides some evidence for the   3 
US of an increase in the wage elasticity of female labor supply from 1900 up to the 1950s 
with  a  decline  thereof  later  on.    Heckman  (1993)  in  a  survey  was  concerned  with  this 
development and noted that “whether labor supply behaviour by sex will converge to equality 
as female labor-force participation continues to increase is an open question” (p. 118).  
 
  In this paper we look at trends in wage elasticities concerning work participation and 
weekly hours for Austrian men and women between 1987 and 1999. We differentiate between 
married  and  never-married  women;  which  is  very  important  in  explaining  labour  force 
participation. As these differences are negligible for men we refrain from this distinction. 
Labor supply elasticities give an impression about attachment to the labor force; very high 
elasticities of (married) women have often been interpreted as evidence for low labor force 
attachment and a traditional family role model: the male bread-winner model where female 
market participation was considered as supplementary and more volatile. Due to increasing 
educational attainment of women, developments on the marriage market – lower marriage and 
higher  divorce  rates  –  and  most  importantly  changing  social  roles  and  norms,  it  can  be 
expected  that  this  traditional  male-breadwinner  model  will  have  considerably  lost  its 
importance.  
 
The development of labor supply elasticity is an important policy problem on its own 
right. Deadweight losses of taxation as well as effects of wage subsidies and features of the 
tax system like joint (family) taxation crucially depend on it. Recent tax reform proposals of 
gender based taxation (Alesina et al., 2007) suggest taxing women less heavily than men in 
order  to  fight  against  unequal  labor  market  outcomes  of  men  and  women  in  terms  of 
participation and wages; these proposals rely on gender differences in labor supply elasticities 
and claim to increase efficiency and gender equality at the same time. 
 
 Similar to results for the U.S. (Blau and Kahn, 2007; Heim, 2004), also for Austria we 
find  a  declining  responsiveness  of  married  women  to  changes  in  wages;  never  married 
women’s behavior was always much closer to the behavior of men.   
 
2. Data and Methods 
 
Since there are no long-term panel data on wages and employment in Austria we use instead 
repeated cross-sectional survey data gathered from the Austrian Micro-Census as a pseudo-  4 
panel.  The  Austrian  Micro-Census  consists  of  two  programs:  A  base  program  covering 
demographic,  household  and  employment  characteristics  and  special  programs  on  a  more 
irregular basis. Between 1981 and 1999, every other year the income data of the respondents 
were collected through this special program. Since the Austrian Micro-Census at that time 
utilized a rotating sample (1/8 of the respondents in the sample were replaced by new ones 
every  quarter)  and  the income  data  were  only  collected every  other  year,  we  restrict  our 
analysis to repeated cross-sectional data. To take out effects of an increasing educational 
attainment over time we focus on (never) married women aged between 25 and 59 and men 
between 25 and 64. Typically in national employment statistics, long and varying levels of 
parental leave are coded as employment spells. As we focus on labor force participation, we 
defined respondents in parental leave as being out of labor force. As parental leave spells 
were not coded appropriately before 1987, we cannot extend our analysis further back. Due to 
the unaltered data collecting and processing in the Micro-Census Program during these years 
and the adjustments concerning parental leave, the resulting data are highly representative and 
comparable over the time and thus can serve as a pseudo-panel for the purpose of studying 
changes in labor supply relations.     
 
We use a three-stage estimation procedure. As we are interested in the determinants of 
participation and working hours, we have to construct potential wages for persons who are not 
observed having positive working hours – thus their wage rates are not available. For these 
persons, market wages have to be predicted. We use a Heckman two-step wage regression 
(Heckman, 1979), taking sample selection into account.  
 
To analyze participation in market work (the extensive margin) we use a probit model 
where a latent variable 
*
i Y , the latent propensity to participate, is related to individual and 
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  The  hours  of  work  equation  (the  intensive  margin)  is  estimated  using  a  Tobit 
regression where the latent number of hours 
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  As  explanatory  variables  we  use  demographic  variables,  such  as  education,  age, 
nationality, marital status and number of children of different age groups as well as the hourly 
wage and other household income as financial indicators.  
 
Finally, for predicting the potential market wages for non-participating persons in the 
labor force, we are using (following Heckman, 1979) wage functions with a sample selection 
correction term.
1 Using the two-step approach, we estimate the propensity to participate in 
market work for all persons in the data using a probit model first.
2 This enables us to calculate 
a sample selection term to correct for the (likely) possibility that the persons with observed 
wages  do  not  consist  of  a  random  sample  of  the  population.  Instead,  it  might  consist  of 
persons who tend to work because of their higher unobserved productivity. For the second 
step, we regress log hourly wages on education levels, (potential) experience and region types 
plus  the  sample  selection  correction  term,  enabling  us  to  predict  potential  wages  for  non 
participating  persons.
3  A  more  in-depth  description  of  the  process  can  also  be  found  in 




Table  1  presents  marginal  effects  for  labor  force  participation  of  married  women,  never-
married women and for men in the years 1987 and 1999. Similar estimations were done for all 
other years in our sample period. Figure 1 shows the calculated corresponding compensated 
wage elasticities over time. As the participation equations don’t show elasticities and thus 
don’t  give  a  clear  pattern  about  participation  reaction  to  wages,  when  discussing  wage 
elasticities we will primarily be concerned with the results in Figure 1.  
 
Substantial differences between the three demographic groups can be seen. Higher 
education leads to higher participation, in particular so in the case of women, but even more 
so for married women. The presence of children has the expected gender-specific effects: 
married women reduce participation in the presence of children, irrespective of age; single 
                                                 
1 Concerns about missing wages at the upper end of the wage distribution due to non-reporting were studied by 
Fersterer and Winter-Ebmer (2003), who found that non-reporting posed no problem for typical wage functions. 
2  As  variables  in  the  participation  equation  we  use  education  levels,  (potential)  experience,  as  identifying 
variables the number of children in different age groups, disposable household income and region types. 
3 The sample selection correction term is positive, but only significant at a 10% level for married women.     6 
mothers reduce their participation only during the time there children are below school-entry 
age, whereas men increase their participation in the presence of children. These results are 
compatible with a traditional role allocation in the family: the mother cares for her kids at 
home, whereas the father has to earn more money to feed the kid. There are some changes to 
this traditional family role model over time: apart from the first 3 years of a new-born child, 
in later years married women reduce their participation less with the presence of children. The 
first effect might be due to increased provision and generosity of maternity leave provision in 
Austrian social law. Over the course of the childhood, the reaction of work participation to the 
number of dependent children was reduced approximately by one third between 1987 and 
1999, which speaks to a better compatibility of children and career. 
4 On the other hand, we 
can see a clear increase for men.  
 
Compensated wage elasticities for participation are presented in Figure 1. The first 
impression confirms results from other countries: wage elasticities for men are very low, but 
positive in every year; they fluctuate between 0.05 and 0.1 percent. For women, marital status 
plays a big role. Whereas married women have high wage elasticities, never-married women’s 
participation behavior is fairly close to that of male workers with elasticities between 0.13 and 
0.25. Both groups do not exhibit any noticeable trend over time.
5 The only remarkable trend 
over time concerns married women. Their participation responsiveness to wages increases 
somewhat in the late 80s, but after 1991, the wage elasticity is reduced steadily from 0.73 to 
0.38.  That means that within one decade the wage elasticity of married women’s participation 
behaviour almost halved. This trend is similar to trends in the U.S.:  elasticities for married 
women dropped from about 0.8-0.9 in the 1980s to around 0.4 in the year 2000 (Blau and 
Kahn,  2007).  Again  similar  to  the  U.S.  trend,  the  reaction  of  married  women’s  work 
participation to other household income (typically the spouses’ income or unearned income) 
is negative but falling over time.  
 
Looking at the behaviour of married women over time, selection issues might cause a 
problem because of increasingly lower marriage rates; thus making our samples of married 
and single women non-comparable over time. This should not be a concern for our analysis 
because it can be assumed that the decrease in the propensity to marry will primarily concern 
                                                 
4 Del Bono et al. (2008) find that compatibility of career and family is still a problem for Austrian women, in 
particular for those in better-paying and more career-oriented jobs. This study does look at fertility rates and 
does only look at one point in time. 
5 See Bishop et al. (2005) for US evidence on the development of single women’s wage elasticity over time, 
which are also smaller and somewhat falling.    7 
women more attached to the labour force, having less children, etc. In our analysis, these 
women, generically more attached to the labor market, will over time be taken out from the 
sample of married women. Taking this demographic shift into account would even increase 
the downward trend in labour supply elasticities over time.  
 
Table 2 reports results for weekly hours of work equations with the corresponding 
compensated wage elasticities over time in Figure 2.  
 
  Many results are similar to the participation case. Married women work more 
hours if they are better educated, less if they have children; both relations are somewhat less 
pronounced in 1999. Children in pre-school age are a significant hindrance for full-time work; 
a phenomenon which is consistent over this period.  
 
Elasticities  for  hourly  wages  are  shown  in  Figure  2.  The  pattern  is  similar  to  the 
participation pattern, although the convergence in hours elasticities is much higher: Men have 
much  lower  elasticities relative  to  women throughout  the  period;  between  0.02  and  0.09. 
Married  and  never-married  women  react  somewhat  stronger  with  their  weekly  hours  on 
changes in wage rates. After an increase in 1989 married women’s elasticities continuously 
drop from a high of 0.38 to a low of 0.15 at the end of the 1990s. Contrary to the pattern of 
participation rates, the variability of hours of work of married and never-married women is 
fairly similar, although the latter’s elasticities are somewhat lower in all observed years. 
 
  As wages and education are strongly correlated due to the wage formation process 
based on human capital, effects of wages and education on labor force participation could 
empirically be difficult to disentangle. This is particularly important considering changes over 
time. Given the rise in educational attainment of women over this period together with falling 
rates  of  returns  (Fersterer  and  Winter-Ebmer,  2003),  it  is  not  clear,  if  the  falling  wage 
elasticities of married women are due to behavioral changes or a different composition of the 
workforce.  A  simple  test  for  the  hypothesis  that  the  falling  wage  elasticity  is  due  to  an 
increasing share of highly-educated women is to look at sub-samples of women who have the 
same education. Due to smaller sample sizes, we combine persons from two surveys each – 
1987 with 1989 and 1997 with 1999 – and combine also persons having attended academic 
secondary school with those holding a vocational secondary school degree. The results are 
shown in Table 3 for participation and hours of work. Looking at married women we see that   8 
– with one exception, secondary schooling – wage elasticities in all educational groups are 
falling in this period. This is true for participation in market work as well as for weekly hourly 
wages.  These  results  reinforce  the  claim  that,  in  fact,  labor  force  attachment  of  married 
women changed in the last decade leading to lower reactions of labor force participation with 
respect to the wage.  
 
How do these labor force participation elasticities compare to other Austrian studies? 
Zweimüller (1987) uses the Micro-Census for 1984 and finds a wage elasticity of 1.11 and an 
hours elasticity of 0.17; the estimates refer to all women. Wernhart and Neuwirth (2007) are 
using the 2004 edition of EU SILC to estimate wage elasticities for participation, using a 
sample of mothers with the youngest child below the age of 15. They find a wage elasticity of 
0.509 for all mothers and a higher wage elasticity of 0.746 for the subgroup of mothers with 
the  youngest  child  below  the  age  of  6.  They  argue  that  due  to  higher  opportunity  costs 
(especially for institutional childcare) the decision to participate (or not) in the labor force 
during this phase of life depends more on the potential wage. Dearing et al. (2007) are using a 
structural labor supply model distinguishing the states of full-time and part-time participation 
as well as non-participation. They concentrate only on mothers with children below the age of 
ten years and use also data from the EU SILC 2004. A one percent increase in gross hourly 
wage increases participation of all mothers by 0.155 percentage points, more so in the case of 
mothers with elder children; which translates into an elasticity of 0.31 percent. This boost in 
participation arises from an increase in part-time participation of 0.058 and an increase in full-
time participation of 0.098 percentage points.  




 This paper is the first to study changes in the reaction of female labor supply to wages for a 
European country in-depth. Similar to studies for the US, we find falling wage elasticities for 
married women over time. This applies both to the participation as well as the hours decision. 
This fall only occurred starting at the end of the 1980s, which is considerably later as the 
development in the US. One interpretation might be that the increase in women’s educational 
attainment occurred much earlier in the US as well as the general increase in female labor 
supply.  
   9 
As hours elasticities have been traditionally lower for married women, there hours 
reactions to wage changes is nowadays already very close to that of men: men and women 
have become very equal, indeed. Starting from a much higher gender difference, participation 
elasticities for married women also fell substantially, but they are still noticeably higher than 
those for men.  
 
These changes have important policy consequences. Lower wage elasticities imply 
lower disincentive effects and lower deadweight losses from taxation. Moreover, they imply 
also lower positive effects from public programs such as wage subsidies and tax decreases. 
On the other hand, negative effects of joint income taxation will be smaller as well. Finally, 
the closer men and women get in their labor supply behaviour, the less opportunities are there 
for gender based taxation (Alesina et al., 2007) whereby taxes for more elastic women are to 
be reduced to increase gender equality.    10 
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 Table 1: Participation equation  
Women  Men 
Married  Never Married  All 
  
Dep. Var.: Work 
Participation (0/1)  1987  1999  1987  1999  1987  1999 
 



















  (0.024) 
 
(0.018)  (0.042)  (0.028)  (0.008)  (0.009) 
Log  Other Household Income  - 0.016
***  - 0.005
**  - 0.003  - 0.006
***  - 0.001  - 0.000 
  (0.002) 
 
(0.003)  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Age
  + 0.038
***  + 0.086
***  + 0.062
***  + 0.098
***  + 0.046
***  + 0.056
*** 
  (0.006) 
 
(0.007)  (0.009)  (0.008)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Age
2  - 0.001
***  - 0.001
***  - 0.001
***  - 0.001
***  - 0.001
***  - 0.001
*** 
  (0.000) 
 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)
  (0.000)
  (0.000) 
Education (Base: Compulsory)             
Apprentice  + 0.050
***  + 0.038
***  + 0.116
***  + 0.126
***  + 0.009
*  + 0.049
*** 
  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.021)  (0.019)  (0.005)  (0.006) 
Lower vocational school  + 0.072
***  + 0.044
***  + 0.120
***  + 0.132
***  + 0.016
*  + 0.046
*** 
  (0.018)  (0.017)  (0.023)  (0.018)  (0.008)  (0.006) 
Secondary academic school  - 0.034  + 0.054
**  - 0.246
***  - 0.052
*  - 0.128
***  - 0.040
*** 
  (0.027)  (0.026)  (0.053)  (0.035)  (0.019)  (0.013) 
Secondary vocational school   + 0.049  + 0.136
***  + 0.037  + 0.068
**  - 0.014  + 0.035
*** 
  (0.032)  (0.021)  (0.041)  (0.025)  (0.013)  (0.007) 
University  + 0.318
***  + 0.181
***  + 0.102
***  + 0.121
***  + 0.015  + 0.065
*** 
  (0.027)  (0.022)  (0.030)  (0.021)  (0.010)  (0.005) 
 
Number of Children 
     
     
between 0 and 3 years  - 0.259
***  - 0.296
***  - 0.238
***  - 0.325
***  + 0.031
***  + 0.032
*** 
  (0.015) 
 
(0.016)  (0.038)  (0.028)  (0.010)  (0.011) 
between 4 and 6 years  - 0.163
***  - 0.109
***  - 0.148
***  - 0.103
***  + 0.017
*  + 0.049
*** 
  (0.013) 
 
(0.014)  (0.043)  (0.029)  (0.010)  (0.014) 
between 7 and 9 years  - 0.129
***  - 0.118
***  + 0.012  - 0.038  + 0.016  + 0.012 
  (0.013) 
 
(0.013)  (0.064)  (0.035)  (0.010)  (0.011) 
between 10 and 15 years  - 0.101
***  - 0.076
***  + 0.055  - 0.037  + 0.016
***  + 0.036
*** 
  (0.008) 
 
(0.009)  (0.036)  (0.032)  (0.005)  (0.007) 
between 16 and 18 years  - 0.053
***  - 0.034
***  + 0.113  - 0.056  + 0.016
***  + 0.042
*** 
  (0.011) 
 
(0.013)  (0.078)  (0.056)  (0.005)  (0.009) 
 
Family Status (Base: not married) 
   
       
Married  -  -  -  -  + 0.063
***  + 0.082
*** 
          (0.009) 
 
(0.009) 
Divorced  -  -  -  -  + 0.013  + 0.014 
          (0.009) 
 
(0.009) 
Widowed  -  -  -  -  + 0.017  + 0.022 




Nationality (Base: Austria) 
       
   
(Ex -) Yugoslavia  + 0.389
***  + 0.148
***  + 0.122  + 0.060  + 0.038
**  + 0.014 
  (0.029) 
 
(0.029)  (0.053)  (0.053)  (0.011)  (0.012) 
Turkey  + 0.199
***  - 0.042  -  + 0.167  + 0.048
*  - 0.016 
  (0.055) 
 
(0.044) 
  (0.027)  (0.013)  (0.021) 
Other Nationality  - 0.213
***  - 0.209
***  - 0.101  - 0.054  - 0.063
***  - 0.179
*** 
  (0.046) 
 
(0.034)  (0.091)  (0.053)  (0.031)  (0.027) 
Participation  0.464  0.557  0.784  0.769  0.836  0.828 
N  10912  10445  1750  2669  15184  15983 
Pseudo R
2  0.17  0.18  0.21  0.28  0.48  0.41 
*** = significant at 1%         ** = significant at 5%           * = significant at 10% 
Notes: Entries are marginal effects with standard errors in brackets. Marginal effects for dummy variables are calculated as the change in 
predicted probability when that variable is increased from 0 to 1 with all other variables at their mean values.   13 
Table 2: Weekly Hours 
Women  Men 
Married  Never Married  All 
 
Dep. Var.: Weekly Hours 
1987  1999  1987  1999  1987  1999 
 

















  (0.669) 
 
(0.458)  (1.622)  (1.042)  (0.560)  (0.470) 
Log  Other Household Income  - 0.505
***  - 0.265
***  - 0.045  - 0.098  - 0.064
*  - 0.004 
  (0.057) 
 
(0.065)  (0.104)  (0.067)  (0.038)  (0.032) 
Age
  + 1.359
***  + 2.577
***  + 3.291
***  + 3.955
***  + 4.889
***  + 4.645
*** 
  (0.176) 
 
(0.171)  (0.376)  (0.293)  (0.123)  (0.114) 
Age
2  - 0.022
***  - 0.035
***  - 0.045
***  - 0.054
***  - 0.064
***  - 0.060
*** 
  (0.002) 
 
(0.002)  (0.005)  (0.004)
  (0.001)
  (0.001) 
Education (Base: Compulsory)             
Apprentice  + 1.435
***  + 0.775
**  + 5.036
***  + 5.550
***  - 0.016  + 4.357
*** 
  (0.398)  (0.358)  (1.174)  (0.947)  (0.352)  (0.359) 
Lower vocational school  + 2.342
***  + 1.832
***  + 6.120
***  + 6.492
***  + 1.430
***  + 6.239
*** 
  (0.547)  (0.477)  (1.392)  (1.154)  (0.589)  (0.592) 
Secondary academic school  - 0.345  + 2.228
***  - 7.329
***  - 1.574  - 4.226
***  + 0.481 
  (0.789)  (0.754)  (1.348)  (1.183)  (0.649)  (0.654) 
Secondary vocational school   + 2.156
**  + 4.508
***  + 3.389
*  + 4.594
***  + 0.007  + 5.123
*** 
  (0.976)  (0.674)  (1.974)  (1.243)  (0.698)  (0.579) 
University  + 10.962
***  + 6.727
***  + 5.312
***  + 7.446
***  + 2.934
***  + 9.061
*** 
  (1.292)  (0.789)  (1.836)  (1.325)  (0.732)  (0.622) 
 
Number of Children 
     
     
between 0 and 3 years  - 6.843
***  - 8.233
***  - 15.403
***  - 17.894
***  + 1.237
***  + 0.765
** 
  (0.450) 
 
(0.430)  (1.879)  (1.205)  (0.390)  (0.367) 
between 4 and 6 years  - 4.256
***  - 3.370
***  - 6.239
***  - 5.639
***  - 0.071  + 0.068 
  (0.402) 
 
(0.377)  (1.986)  (1.171)  (0.373)  (0.381) 
between 7 and 9 years  - 3.238
***  - 3.406
***  + 0.133  - 5.762
***  - 0.214  - 0.619
* 
  (0.366) 
 
(0.338)  (2.536)  (1.344)  (0.359)  (0.357) 
between 10 and 15 years  - 2.554
***  - 2.166
***  - 0.683  - 2.081
*  + 0.063  + 0.194 
  (0.236) 
 
(0.227)  (1.362)  (1.160)  (0.232)  (0.243) 
between 16 and 18 years  - 1.229
***  - 0.945
***  + 3.874  - 2.895  + 1.756
***  + 1.363
*** 
  (0.312) 
 
(0.321)  (2.623)  (2.027)  (0.315)  (0.351) 
 
Family Status (Base: not married) 
   
       
Married  -  -  -  -  + 3.077
***  + 4.295
*** 
          (0.437) 
 
(0.378) 
Divorced  -  -  -  -  - 1.821
**  - 1.209
** 
          (0.775) 
 
(0.598) 
Widowed  -  -  -  -  + 1.196  - 0.808 




Nationality (Base: Austria) 
       
   
(Ex -) Yugoslavia  + 10.966
***  + 5.864
***  + 5.685  + 4.091  - 3.835
***  - 2.379
*** 
  (1.579) 
 
(1.005)  (4.343)  (2.765)  (1.011)  (0.680) 
Turkey  + 6.715
***  - 0.973  -  - 0.111  - 2.239  - 2.244
** 
  (2.221) 
 
(1.161) 
  (5.779)  (1.486)  (0.972) 
other Nationality  - 5.408
***  - 4.296
***  - 6.346
***  - 5.942
***  - 3.602
***  - 8.216
*** 
  (1.283) 
 
(0.765)  (2.546)  (1.581)  (1.256)  (0.668) 
Expected Weekly Hours  29.391  26.164  31.772  29.310  34.972  33.147 
N  10912  10445  1750  2669  15184  15983 
Pseudo R
2  0.04  0.04  0.03  0.04  0.06  0.05 
*** = significant at 1%         ** = significant at 5%           * = significant at 10% 
Notes: Entries are marginal effects under the condition that weekly hours > 0 
   14 











1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999
married women never married women men  
 
 











1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999
married women never married women men   
   
1
5
 
 
T
a
b
l
e
 
3
:
 
P
a
r
t
i
c
i
p
a
t
i
o
n
 
a
n
d
 
h
o
u
r
s
 
e
l
a
s
t
i
c
i
t
i
e
s
 
w
i
t
h
i
n
 
e
d
u
c
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
g
r
o
u
p
s
:
 
m
a
r
r
i
e
d
 
a
n
d
 
n
e
v
e
r
-
m
a
r
r
i
e
d
 
w
o
m
e
n
 
1
9
8
7
/
8
9
 
 
 
 
P
a
r
t
i
c
i
p
a
t
i
o
n
 
 
 
 
 
H
o
u
r
s
 
 
 
 
C
o
m
p
u
l
s
o
r
y
 
 
e
d
u
c
a
t
i
o
n
 
A
p
p
r
e
n
t
i
c
e
 
L
o
w
e
r
 
V
o
c
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
s
c
h
o
o
l
 
S
e
c
o
n
d
a
r
y
 
s
c
h
o
o
l
 
U
n
i
v
e
r
s
i
t
y
 
C
o
m
p
u
l
s
o
r
y
 
 
e
d
u
c
a
t
i
o
n
 
A
p
p
r
e
n
t
i
c
e
 
L
o
w
e
r
 
V
o
c
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
s
c
h
o
o
l
 
S
e
c
o
n
d
a
r
y
 
s
c
h
o
o
l
 
U
n
i
v
e
r
s
i
t
y
 
 
M
a
r
r
i
e
d
 
8
7
/
8
9
 
 
+
0
,
5
4
2
*
*
*
 
 
[
1
0
7
0
2
]
 
 
+
0
,
3
9
9
*
*
*
 
 
[
5
4
2
7
]
 
 
+
0
,
3
9
1
*
*
*
 
 
[
2
7
4
3
]
 
 
+
0
,
3
7
3
*
*
*
 
 
[
1
6
4
5
]
 
 
+
0
,
2
2
8
*
*
*
 
 
[
7
1
4
]
 
 
+
0
,
1
7
4
*
*
*
 
 
[
1
0
7
0
2
]
 
 
+
0
,
2
3
7
*
*
*
 
 
[
5
4
2
7
]
 
 
+
0
,
2
2
7
*
*
*
 
 
[
2
7
4
3
]
 
 
+
0
,
2
6
7
*
*
*
 
 
[
1
6
4
5
]
 
 
+
0
,
2
5
3
*
*
*
 
 
[
7
1
4
]
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
N
e
v
e
r
 
m
.
 
8
7
/
8
9
 
 
+
0
,
0
9
7
 
[
1
1
2
4
]
 
 
+
0
,
2
4
2
 
[
8
4
0
]
 
 
+
0
,
0
2
3
 
[
5
8
0
]
 
 
+
0
,
9
3
2
*
*
*
 
[
5
5
6
]
 
 
+
0
,
1
7
1
*
*
 
[
3
3
0
]
 
 
+
0
,
0
1
9
 
[
1
1
2
4
]
 
 
-
0
,
0
9
9
 
[
8
4
0
]
 
 
-
0
,
1
0
2
 
[
5
8
0
]
 
 
+
0
,
0
3
7
*
*
*
 
[
5
5
6
]
 
 
+
0
,
0
2
9
 
[
3
3
0
]
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*
*
*
 
=
 
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
t
 
a
t
 
1
%
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*
*
 
=
 
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
t
 
a
t
 
5
%
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*
 
=
 
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
t
 
a
t
 
1
0
%
 
N
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
o
b
s
e
r
v
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
i
n
 
b
r
a
c
k
e
t
s
 
 
1
9
9
7
/
9
9
 
 
 
 
P
a
r
t
i
c
i
p
a
t
i
o
n
 
 
 
 
 
H
o
u
r
s
 
 
 
 
C
o
m
p
u
l
s
o
r
y
 
 
e
d
u
c
a
t
i
o
n
 
A
p
p
r
e
n
t
i
c
e
 
L
o
w
e
r
 
V
o
c
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
s
c
h
o
o
l
 
S
e
c
o
n
d
a
r
y
 
s
c
h
o
o
l
 
U
n
i
v
e
r
s
i
t
y
 
C
o
m
p
u
l
s
o
r
y
 
 
e
d
u
c
a
t
i
o
n
 
A
p
p
r
e
n
t
i
c
e
 
L
o
w
e
r
 
V
o
c
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
s
c
h
o
o
l
 
S
e
c
o
n
d
a
r
y
 
s
c
h
o
o
l
 
U
n
i
v
e
r
s
i
t
y
 
 
M
a
r
r
i
e
d
 
9
7
/
9
9
 
 
+
0
,
3
6
2
*
*
*
 
 
[
7
0
6
5
]
 
 
+
0
,
3
3
3
*
*
*
 
 
[
6
8
5
0
]
 
 
+
0
,
2
3
9
*
*
*
 
 
[
3
1
4
4
]
 
 
+
0
,
4
8
1
*
*
*
 
 
[
2
4
4
4
]
 
 
+
0
,
0
4
9
*
*
*
 
 
[
1
2
4
6
]
 
 
+
0
,
0
8
9
*
*
*
 
 
[
7
0
6
5
]
 
 
+
0
,
1
0
2
*
*
*
 
 
[
6
8
5
0
]
 
 
+
0
,
0
5
1
 
 
[
3
1
4
4
]
 
 
+
0
,
1
7
1
*
*
*
 
 
[
2
4
4
4
]
 
 
+
0
,
0
7
4
 
 
[
1
2
4
6
]
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
N
e
v
e
r
 
m
.
 
9
7
/
9
9
 
 
+
0
,
3
3
5
*
*
*
 
[
1
0
0
5
]
 
 
+
0
,
2
6
2
*
*
*
 
[
1
5
1
9
]
 
 
+
0
,
3
2
4
*
*
*
 
[
8
0
7
]
 
 
+
0
,
2
9
2
*
*
*
 
[
1
1
6
3
]
 
 
+
0
,
1
3
9
*
*
 
[
6
5
3
]
 
 
+
0
,
1
5
0
*
*
*
 
[
1
0
0
5
]
 
 
+
0
,
2
0
4
*
*
*
 
[
1
5
1
9
]
 
 
+
0
,
4
1
9
*
*
*
 
[
8
0
7
]
 
 
+
0
,
1
4
9
*
*
*
 
[
1
1
6
3
]
 
 
+
0
,
0
6
6
*
*
*
 
[
6
5
3
]
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*
*
*
 
=
 
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
t
 
a
t
 
1
%
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*
*
 
=
 
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
t
 
a
t
 
5
%
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*
 
=
 
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
t
 
a
t
 
1
0
%
 
N
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
o
b
s
e
r
v
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
i
n
 
b
r
a
c
k
e
t
s
 
 